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Inspired by many authors and researchers on production methods, this article traces in detail the history of Toyota and how they reached the Dantotsu.

The history of Toyota finds its origins in 1897 while Sakichi Toyoda decides to diversify a family-owned carpet business in machine production. In 1902, Sakichi conceived a loom and founded the same year the Toyoda group. In 1926, he developed a loom that automatically ceased operations when one of the yarns breaks warning his operator of the production of an imperfect garment. It was far from any doubt that this innovation would become some decades later one of the pillars of the Toyota production system. In the same year, he founded the Toyoda Automatic Loom Works (TALW) to produce his machines.

After stays in America and Europe, Sakichi developed a dream: to build cars (the legend says that he asked his son to Kiichiro to get started in car manufacturing. The Japanese market dominated by the American brands-GM, Ford… Finding that the models were unreliable and that it was necessary to “build cars with Japanese hands”). A dream a little crazy in Japan from the years 1920 while the country has practically no roads, no middle class able to buy a car and a local market dominated by GM and Ford1. In 1929, Platt Brothers offered Sakichi 100 000 pounds to buy him the patent for his automatic loom. It is Kiichiro Toyoda, son of Sakichi who is negotiating. He is a mechanical engineer who graduated from the University of Tokyo. The agreement allows Toyoda to retain the rights of its invention for Japan, the United States and China. For Kiichiro, the conclusion of the transaction is an opportunity to travel in Europe and North America where he develops the same fascination as his father for cars and production systems. These trips allow him to study the production processes of automobiles in these countries.

Sakichi died in 1930 and Risaburo Toyoda, son of Sakichi and brother of Kiichiro, took over the family business. At the same time, Kiichiro established an automotive department within the TALW. At the same time, Kiichiro, buys, dismantles, copies and improves its first Chevrolet. He is aware that he has to master the mechanics of the engine and that he must think about a production system before embarking on this market. In 1933 he persuaded his brother and the management of the company to make the necessary investments to embark on this sector of activity.

This development work culminated in the spring of 1935 to the production of the first car “A1” and in spring 1936 to the production of the first truck ” G1 “.

It was then that we decided to replace the ” D ” of Toyoda with a ” T “, recalls Eiji Toyoda, cousin of Kiichiro2. The name Toyota sounds better and it is written in Japanese characters using 8 strokes instead of 10, which is a sign of prosperity in Japan.

The Toyota Motor Company was officially created on August 28th of the following year. Kiichiro is in charge of the management of the new entity.

Also in 1936, Kiichiro acquired 200 hectares of ground in Koromo. It is a small town in the Nagoya region which will be renamed Toyota City in 1959. The Koromo factory was built in 1938. Kiichiro Toyoda and Takatoshi Kan, the factory designer, are trying to build a production system that best integrates with local conditions. Kiichiro wants to offer Japanese buyers an economical vehicle. To achieve this he wants to reproduce the American production principles that would offer products at lower costs. At the same time, he knew that he could not reach the production rate of the American manufacturers because the size of the Japanese market cannot absorb all this car flow. While in 1910 Ford was already producing 100 000 cars a year, Kiichiro estimated that a production of 3 000 vehicles could ensure the company’s financial success. It was therefore illusory to reproduce an assembly line like Ford’s because of the small volumes that would be produced. Also, Kan develops machine tools that can adjust to multiple cylinder sizes. It also installs more equipment that can be used by semi-skilled personnel rather than more sophisticated machines that required more thorough interviews with highly skilled workers. In addition, financial constraints prevented the casting unit from being equipped with parts of all necessary equipment before the Second World War. In addition, to increase its pool of qualified employees, Toyota is developing a home training program for its young apprentices3.

The Koromo factory did not have time to produce its first car before the outbreak of hostilities between Japan and China in 1937. In 1941, the country was trained in the Second World War. During the conflict, Toyota almost exclusively produces a single truck model for army needs. At that time, the rationing of raw materials was the biggest obstacle to the increase in production. Military control over manufacturing activities prevented efficient resource planning.

The aftermath of the Second World War proved very difficult for the Toyota company. Under American Protectorate, the economic policy of the banker Joseph Dodge cuts the credit of many Japanese companies plunging the country into a deep deflation. Toyota recorded losses of 110 million yen in November 1949 and March 1950. Seeing the mass redundancies of the other manufacturers Isuzu and Nissan, the Union asks management not to return any employees in exchange for a decrease in wages. An agreement is reached but it will never be signed. At the same time, financial arrangements are made between Toyota and banking institutions in return for staff redundancies. Before this measure, a strike takes place between the end of April and the 10th of June 1950. The result of the conflict led to the departure of 2 146 employees as well as the President and CEO Kiichiro Toyoda and some directors who took responsibility for the conflict. The Korean War that erupts on June 26th allows Toyota to recover financially thanks to military orders4.

At the beginning of the years 1950, Toyota’s management embarked on a five-year plan to modernize its facilities. The goal is to increase production capacity and modernize equipment. The plan foresees investments of 5.8 million yen, of which 1.7 million are devoted to the importation of machine tools. It was during this decade that Toyota produced its first real car, the Crown, in January 1955.

Internationalization of activities5

Following the financial crisis of the years 1950, the financial arrangement with the banking institutions requires that Toyota create a separate entity, Toyota Motor sales (TMS), dedicated to the sales and marketing activities of the production. The bankers felt that the management of Toyota had neglected the marketing activities and that it was necessary to dedicate a separate team of managers6. MSD begins to export vehicles from 1952. At this time TMS mainly targets niche markets by promoting four-wheeled vehicles like the Land Cruiser and in areas where the presence of competitors was more erased. Thus, the regions of Latin America (Colombia, Peru, Bolivia, San Salvador or Costa Rica) of the Caribbean (Puerto Rico and Dominican Republic), Asia (Taiwan, Thailand), Oceania (Australia), Middle East (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Jordan) and Africa (Ethiopia, South Africa) were the main export destinations in the early years of 1960.

At the same time, some countries such as Thailand and Brazil had import tariffs that were considered prohibitive. So Toyota decides to locate assembly plants there. In the case of Brazil, Toyota’s desire to meet the requirements of local content governments, it therefore implants a production plant in 1958. The investment is proving to be a failure both from the point of view of production and management because the Brazilian partner is involved in a political scandal. TMS abandons this market in 1964.

In subsequent years, Toyota encounters two other bad experiences. In 1972, the Korean partner who assembles since 1969 its cars establishes a partnership with GM. Toyota loses its production unit in this country. In Taiwan, the local partner, Lu Ho AIC, in charge of production, was acquired by Ford in 1973. This leads to the failure of the negotiations with this company.

In addition to the difficulties of settling in foreign markets, exported vehicles did not always meet local requirements, for example, in the United States, cars did not run fast enough for major roads. For this market, TMS abandoned in 1960 and for a period of four years, its exports of cars recognising the product’s incompatibility with market standards as well as the poor after-sales service. TMS and Toyota Motor Company are establishing a jointexport Conferenceto develop a coherent export strategy.

This strategy is proving fruitful since in the years 1960, Toyota is organising 26 new distribution networks in 24 countries, mainly in Europe. On this continent, Toyota penetrates mainly the markets of countries such as Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, Belgium or Switzerland. Its presence is more timid or non-existent in Britain, France, Italy, Austria or the Federal Republic of Germany where the presence of well-established car producers offers strong competition. Until the end of the years 1960, Toyota maintained its niche strategy offering a car, the Corona, between the Volkswagen Beetle and an American compact car.

The 1974 oil crisis plays the role of accelerators for Toyota’s exports. From 1968, the United States became the first export market. At the beginning of the years 1980, the company focused on the production capacity of the Toyota City factories in Japan to supply its foreign markets with 11 assembly units in some countries (e.g. in Peru, Ecuador, Portugal, Kenya, South Africa, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Australia and New Zealand). In 1982, Toyota Motor Company and TMS merged to pool their management resources.

At the same time, protectionist measures are beginning to rise in many countries. In 1981, in the face of American pressure, the Japanese government voluntarily restricted the export of cars to that country. Toyota is trying to deal with this situation by increasing the export of the most profitable vehicles and by promoting the families of vehicles that are not affected by the restriction measures. This strategy is proving to be short-lived before the requests of the European Community to the Japanese government to restrict also the exports of vehicles to this continent.

So, after Nissan and Honda, Toyota decides to implement production units abroad. Anxious not to repeat the mistakes of the past, Toyota wants to establish a partnership with a well-established company. At the beginning of the years 1980 negotiations were begun with Ford but they could not be concluded; A continuing disagreement as to the models that would be produced. In 1984, a partnership agreement was signed between Toyota and General Motors (GM) in the Shape of the NUMMI Corporation (New United Motor manufacturing Incorporated). Under the terms of the agreement, GM could learn the Toyota production system in order to produce subcompact cars. In return, Toyota could organize the production as it wishes. This is the Fremont site in California, owned by GM, which is retained to implant the plant. This site of 5 700 employees was closed in 1982 following more than ten years of difficulties including labour relations between the opposing employer and Union parties who could explain that at times the rate of absenteeism was higher than 20 %. The productivity and quality of this plant were significantly lower than other GM sites. En décembre 1984, 99 % des employés de la chaîne de montage du site NUMMI et en fait 75 % des employés qualifiés de cette usine provenaient du bassin de personnel de GM-Fremont7. La Corolla FX de Toyota est introduite en 1986. Sur les bases de cette expérience, les dirigeants se convainquent que Toyota peut exporter son modèle de production. Elle multiplie les usines en Amérique (États-Unis et Canada) et elle démarre la production de voitures en 1992 au Royaume-Uni.

En 1989, Toyota crée la Lexus, son premier véhicule pour le segment de luxe. Cette marque a d’abord été lancée en Amérique du Nord, ensuite en Europe pour finalement atteindre le marché asiatique8.

Alors que le Japon traversait une grave crise économique au cours de la décennie 1990, Toyota a poursuivi sa politique de globalisation de son appareil de production. En 1990, Toyota a 20 usines dans 14 pays9 alors qu’en 2006, on parle de 52 sites dans 26 pays10. « C’est pour nous le moyen de protéger nos opérations des fluctuations monétaires », expliquait Iwao Okijima, vice-président exécutif du constructeur japonais en 199611. Cette politique s’est maintenue alors qu’entre les exercices financiers 2004 et 2005, 65 % de l’augmentation de production était réalisée à l’extérieur du Japon12. Pour soutenir son développement international, Toyota s’associe à des partenaires locaux comme dans le cas de la Turquie ou de la Chine ou des manufacturiers automobiles bien établis comme PSA pour une usine en République Tchèque13. À cette production locale, la direction de Toyota souhaite se rapprocher des fournisseurs afin d’augmenter la part des achats locaux14.

La globalisation de ses opérations s’est accompagnée au début des années 2000 d’une internationalisation de ses finances par une introduction aux bourses de New York et de Londres alors qu’auparavant le titre de l’entreprise ne se transigeait qu’à la Bourse de Tokyo. Ryuji Araki qui était alors le directeur général de la société expliquait ainsi cette manœuvre afin « de créer un environnement permettant une participation plus aisée des investisseurs15. » Pour ce faire, Toyota allait devoir se rapprocher des normes comptables anglo-saxonnes en publiant des résultats trimestriels et non plus uniquement des comptes semestriels ou annuels. Un exercice qui ne devait pas s’avérer trop difficile à réaliser puisque Toyota admettait s’être inspirée des méthodes de gestion financière de GM16.

Par ailleurs, la présence mondiale de Toyota n’est pas répartie uniformément, ainsi, 32,1 % des véhicules neufs produits sont vendus au Japon, 30,7 % aux États-Unis, 13,2 % en Europe et 24 % dans d’autres régions (Chine, Afrique du Sud, Turquie, Chili). La faible présence européenne est visible puisque Toyota n’occupait en 2004 que 5,1 % de part marché dans ce continent, en quatrième position derrière Volkswagen (17,8%), PSA Peugeot (14,2 %) et Ford (11,3 %)17. Dès 1996, Alan Marsh qui était alors vice-président des opérations de Toyota sur le vieux continent reconnaissait déjà que : « Nous ne pouvons éviter le marché le plus ancien, le plus sophistiqué technologiquement et le plus concurrentiel au monde. »

Cette stratégie d’internationalisation doit se faire en douceur. In 2003, Hiroshi Okuda, chairman of the Board of Directors, stated: We must adapt the Toyota production system to each country, modulate it according to location18. A system that was originally typically Japanese.

The implementation of the Toyota Production System

In the aftermath of World War II, Toyota’s situation was very precarious. The financial crisis limited the company’s scope of action. This brought Kiichiro Toyoda to say that ” we have to sell what we produce 19. At that time, one month of stock was found at each of the major production stages. Despite this situation, production was very random. During one month of production, 20 days were devoted to the manufacture of parts and components and 10 days for the assembly of cars. In addition, the post-war context and the conflict with Korea in 1950 created a rationing of resources, as well as staff20.

Traditionally, the production of a car consists of the following steps:

  • The stamping which consists of making parts (bodywork, doors, covers and floors) from metal sheet.
  • The sheet metal that sees to assemble and weld the different parts of the “ crate “.
  • The Paint shop.
  • The mechanics, in parallel with the stamping, the sheet metal and the paint, this operation realizes the engine, the gearbox and the connections to the ground.
  • The assembly which consists of the final assembly of the car (seats, wheels, motor, dashboard, etc.).

 

Initially, Toyota had foundry operations to produce raw parts that would be processed in the operations. More recently, car manufacturers or their suppliers have had to add skills in the field of electronics and plastics.

At the beginning of the years 1950, Toyota’s management wanted to obtain contracts from the US Army. She realizes that she cannot meet the quality requirements of this potential customer. Eiji Toyoda, who then occupies a management Position at Toyota, decides to take inspiration from Ford, with which Toyota has good cuttings, to improve the ways of doing things. It will thus benchmark on the topics of logistics, staff management and even the Ford collective agreement so.

In 1951, Toyota received advice from U.S. Army quality control experts. The methods of statistical quality control are then introduced. In 1953, the company sets up a Quality control Section with an inspection department that is responsible for the design of the control tools and standards to be achieved. In the fall of the same year, Toyota founded the Quality Control Committee , which encompasses the value dimension and sees with the Personnel Management Service and the Quality Control Section has invited experts to offer training to employees 21.

In 1958, Toyota received a contract from the US Army procurement Agency , which required the company’s quality standards to be enhanced to meet those of the U.S. Army. In addition, the implementation of the Kanban Ensured the performance of the production apparatus required contractually: The upstream Positionmust provide parts or components without defect, as the downstream workstation takes only the quantity Position necessary at the appropriate time. Finally, at the end of the years 1950, Corona experienced quality problems in the American market. In May 1959, Eiji Toyoda then executive vice President distributes in the company a pamphlet in which he criticizes the current practices of quality control. It submits the idea that the absence of inspection is the ideal inspection and that to achieve this, it is necessary that all machinery and equipment ensure the quality of the products making the controls unnecessary.

That is why in 1961, Toyota introduces the principles of Total Quality Control. At that time the goal was to achieve the quality international standards for which Toyota was still far. Once this first goal was achieved, Toyota executives wanted to improve it by 50%. To help them achieve this last goal and to adapt the American quality control techniques to Toyota’s characteristics, the company’s management decided to retain the services of Shigeo Shingo in 1965. He graduated in mechanical engineering from Yamanashi Technical College in 1930. In 1945, he was a management consultant. In 1951, he began to apply the principles of statistical quality control and to disseminate the principles of scientific management. In November 1967, Toyota implemented the zero Defect program.

Shingo further pushes the innovations of Ohno on the immobilization of the machine tool when a Part is not correctly placed in order to apply them to the management of the quality. It sets up the principles of the Poka-Yoke where each operator becomes a quality control point. This responsibility avoids the quality control of a certain number of parts only at the end of production. For Ohno, these measures minimize damage, maintain quality and require problems to be detected quickly or prevented if they become recurrent.

It was also during these same years that the various tools were set up which would constitute, what the world would discover 30 years later, the Toyota Production System.

In addition, one of the main artisans in the implementation of this production system is Taiichi Ohno. He was born in 1912 in Manuchouri, China. After studying at Nagoya Technical High School, he joined TALW in 1932. In 1943, he became the assembly manager for the automatic loom division. He was appointed head of the Automotive Mechanics Workshop in August 1949 where he began experimenting with different approaches to produce the quantity of items needed at the desired time or to reduce costs by tracking down waste or Muda . This waste took different forms: overproduction, waiting time, transport time, stock, movement times or defective parts. To improve the production system, he said that the experience gained in the division of looms was a source of useful lessons.

The TPS has several dimensions with many ramifications. To simplify its understanding, the next sub-sections would prefer the presentation of a more circumscribed dimension to the detriment of a chronological sequence of events.

The future of Toyota

Very subtly, the company continues the transformation of its culture and its production system. For example, in the early years of 1990, in the face of pressure from current employees and difficulties in recruiting staff or in order to better integrate women into assembly line activities, a joint management/union Committee was formed to ” humanizing work ‘. A reduction in the annual work time has been programmed. The assembly lines were split into mini-rows separated by buffer stocks, giving each team a certain amount of time to deal with the unexpected. Each mini-line also allows the teams to have a relative control of the realization of a complete product. These developments were explicitly borrowed from Volvo and Mercedes, at a time when they were questioned for their insufficient productivity.22 In fact, the Assembly subsidiary, Toyota Motor Kyushu, serves as a sort of laboratory to explore new innovations for the Toyota Production system.

In the first years of the 21st century, the management of Toyota wanted to push its concept of flexibility of its production units even further. It wants to create a global production system in which its Indonesian or Argentine factories can meet the needs of their respective local markets while being able to quickly meet demand points in other markets International. Such an avenue would delay the addition of new production units to meet the growing demand. Growth that may be faster than forecasts because at the beginning of the year 2007, management is already considering the construction of a ninth plant in North America, while the construction of the eighth is not yet completed. This readiness may come from a willingness of the company to restore the local production ratio which fell to 54% in 2006, while the willingness displayed by the management had to situate it to more than 66%. The promises of local content want to alleviate any criticism23. We would even talk about three additional factories in America, including one in Mexico, in order to deal with demand in that market. In 2006, Toyota’s sales jumped 13% in the United States24.

On the other hand, analysts tend to find that the increase in production in American soil results in a decrease in the quality of the products. In 2005, Toyota had recalled 860 000 vehicles in the world due to a suspension problem. At the beginning of the year 2007, this is a new reminder of 544 000 vehicles mainly in the United States that was announced. In fact, between 2004 and 2006, it is 9.3 million of vehicles in the U.S. and Japanese markets, or 2.5 million more cars than for the period 2001 to 200625. Analysts fear that internationalization ‘ completely kills their strategy since the brand image is very important26. Mr. Watanabe recognized in mid-year 2006 that the company’s accelerated growth was at the expense of sustained attention to quality management27. Measures have been taken. Toyota slowed the release of some vehicles, management decided to take more time for design and it delayed a year (compared to the Japanese market) the release of the new generation of Corollas for the American market to allow Workers in this country to control the construction of this vehicle.

At the same time, the company is also pursuing its policy of reducing waste. For example, at the beginning of the year 2006, workers at the Toyota smelter in Troy, Missouri had the objective of halving, in two years, the cost of producing V6 engines for the Camry sedan. To help them, 300 engineers in Japan are working on a new technology designed to pour molten aluminum into moulds to make engine parts. Achieving this goal would represent an economy of 1 000 per vehicle28.

The company really takes nothing for granted. Already in 1990, Iwao Isomaru, director of personnel, stressed: Our successes are a good reason to change things29. » Fifteen years later, Watanabe, the new president, has a similar speech: When a company rejoices in its growth, problems tend to remain latent or invisible. We want to seize all the problems and clarify the shortcomings in order to strengthen us30. »

Toyota can count on valuable financial resources to carry out its strategy because in Japanese capitalism, Toyota occupies a singular position. In Japan, most major industrial groups have a reference bank which is a minority shareholder and whose opinions are very important in the major strategic decisions. Sakura remains the reference bank of Toyota, and also the first shareholder, but the financial situation of the company limits the influence of the financial institution. In fact, under the reigns of Eiji Toyoda and Shoichiro Toyoda between the years 1960 and 1990, Toyota was obsessed with accumulating reserves. This conservative financial strategy leaves a very healthy balance sheet. A financial solidity that can explain why Toyota agrees to lose money on the sale of each of its hybrid cars in order to quickly secure the dominance of this future market segment. The observation in tables 1 and 2 compares the financial situation of Toyota with some of its competitors.

Table 1-Toyota income and profits (million yen)

(Fiscal year ending March 31)

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

Income – Car

11 271 273

11 930 152

13 858 017

14 788 940

15 963 100

17 098 415

Income-Other

311 957

563 270

424 801

398 351

443 569

511 686

Total

12 879 561

13 424 423

15 106 297

16 054 290

17 294 760

18 551 526

Net income

406 798

471 295

615 824

944 671

1 162 098

1 171 260

Number of vehicles produced

5 002 731

5 275 213

5 404 216

5 982 966

6 513 791

7 231 976

Table 2 – Revenues and benefits of major car manufacturers

(in millions US $) 31

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

GM-Revenue

174 694

180 557

175 353

184 214

182 005

190 812

192 604

GM-Benefits

5 576

4 452

601

1 736

2 862

2 805

(10 567)

Ford-Revenue

162 558

170 064

162 652

162 256

164 331

171 646

177 089

Ford-Profits

7 237

5 410

(5 453)

(980)

495

3 487

2 024

Daimler Chrysler-Revenue

151 035

152 446

136 072

156 838

171 870

192 320

177 365

Daimler Chrysler-Profits

5 141

2 314

(589)

5 114

(527)

3 385

3 376

In the mid-1990, Hiroshi Okuda launched an important diversification strategy. Toyota had to make 10% of its turnover outside the automotive sector for the first years of the 21st century. The President of the company explained his strategy: No trade remains infinitely prosperous and the automobile will not be an exception to this rule. Toyota must be prepared to rely on other activities to ensure its future. A good entrepreneurial model must be valid for forty years. Toyota has participated in the financial services, residential construction, telecommunications and recreational boat construction sector. She has formed an association with Mitsubishi to jointly develop a division for the health sector. This orientation was natural since Toyota already manages a hospital in Toyota City. Analysts believe that a large part of this diversification is destined to serve the car of tomorrow because the builder invests in multimedia integrated with the automobile or intelligent transport infrastructures. An industry specialist explains:

Toyota has a vision of the future in which profits will no longer be on the box but on the components and services that go around. A bit like in computer science today, the real winners are Intel and Microsoft. The group wants to climb into the value chain added and does not intend to become the simple nut screw.

At the same time, Okuda was the same president who wanted Toyota to produce six million vehicles a few years after the year 2000. In 1997, Toyota produced 4.9 million cars.

In the medium term, Toyota’s main weakness may lie in its consumer base. In the American market, the average age of Toyota car buyers is 45 years, the highest figure for a Japanese manufacturer. The company’s management seems to be aware of this reality and invests significant sums of research and development (R & D), or 4% of its turnover, in order to design vehicles that better meet the expectations of Less senior consumers. In 2004, the budget of R & D was 680 billion yen and on arrival, Watanabe increased it by 86.8 billion additional. These R & D efforts may make it possible to realize the dream of the new president of the company: to make a car capable of traversing the distance new York-San Francisco with only one full32.

The history of Toyota

The official TPS Video

The history of the Toyota Production System

Taichi Ohno and TPS

Source

1-D. Barroe (2000)-The Toyoda

2-N. Barre (1996)-from Toyoda to Toyota, a family affair

3-E. Daito (1950)-Automation and the Organization of Production in the Japanese Automobile Industry: Nissan and Toyota in the 1950s

4-K. Shimizu (1999)-The Toyotism

5-K. Shimizu (1999)-Maverick at the Age of Mega-Fusion and mega-merger?

6-Toyota (1988) – A History of the First 50 years

7-P.S. Adler, B. Goldoftas, and R.R. Levine (1999)-Flexibility Versu Efficiency? A Case Study of Model Changeovers in the Toyota Production System

8-B. Abescat (2006)-Toyota: The road of a giant

9-The Economist (2005)-Special Report: The Car Company in Front – Toyota

10-P. Y. (2006)-How Toyota disseminates its training methods»

11-G. Senges (1996)-Japanese manufacturer Toyota accelerates global globalization policy

12-Toyota Motor Corporation (2004)-Financial Summary

13-E.C. Glauser (2005)-The Toyota phenomenon

14-The Nikkei Weekly (2005)-New Toyota Chief looks to “Dream Car”

15-S. Lauer (1999)-to accelerate its internationalization, Toyota is rated in London and New York

16-P. Chabert (1997)-GM and Toyota: Race back to back

17-F. Lacombe (2004)-Europe, next stage of the irresistible ascent of Toyota

18-D. Fainsilber (2003)-Toyota seeks to export its model

19-Toyota Motors Company (1988) – A History of the First 50 years

20-T. Ohno (1988)-Toyota production System beyond Large-Scale production

21-M. Udagawa (1993) – Quality control activities in the Japanese automobile industry: Nissan and Toyota

22-M. Freyssenet and K. Shimizu (1997)-Toyota abandons Toyotism

23-N. Shirouzu (2007) «Toyota Under Pressure to Boost Output

24-La Presse (2007)-up to five new factories in North America

25-I. Rowley (2007)-Even Toyota Isn’t Perfect

26-La Presse (2007)-Toyota reminds 544 000 vehicles

27-The Nikkei Weekly (2006)-Toyota Chief admits Rapid Growth Led to poorer Quality

28-The Press (2006)-Toyota amazes the competition

29-A. Taylor (1990)-Why Toyota keeps Getting better and better and better

30-The Nikkei Weekly (2005)-New Toyota Chief looks to “Dream Car”

31-E. Levy, and S. Ferazani (2005)-Industry surveys: Autos & Auto Parts

32-Les Echos (2005)-Katsuaki Watanabe

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